THE COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM

MICHAEL IINLZER In,trtute for Ad~,at~ced Study
Intellectual fashlons are notor~ously short-lived, very much like fashions In popular muslc, art, or dress. But there are certaln fashlons that seem regularly to reappear. Like pleated trousers or short skirts, they are inconstant features of a larger and more steadily prevailing phenomenon-~n thls case, a certaln way of dress~ng. They have b r~e f but recurrent lives; we know t h e~r transience and except t h e~r return. Needless to say, there IS no afterlife ~n whlch trousers will be permanently pleated or s k~r t s forever short. Recurrence I S all.
Although it operates at a much h~gher level (an Infinitely h~g h e r level7) of cultural s~gnificance, the communltanan cr~tlque of liberalism is like the pleat~ng of trousers: transrent but certa~n to return. It I S a consistently lntermlttent feature of liberal politics and soclal organization. No liberal success will make ~t permanently unattractive. At the same ttme, no communitar~an cr~tique, however penetrating, will ever be anythlng more than an Inconstant feature of liberalism. Someday, perhaps, there will be a larger transformat~on, like the shift from aristocratic knee-breeches to plebian pants, render~ng liberalism and ~t s cntlcs alike ~rrelevant. But I see no present slgns of anyth~ng like that, nor am I sure that we should look forward to it. For now, there IS much to be said for a recurrent cntlque, whose protagonlsts hope only for small victories, part~alIncorporations, and when they are rebuffed or dism~ssed or coopted, fade away for a tlme only to return.
Communitar~an~sm IS usefully contrasted wlth s o c~a l democracy, which has succeeded In establish~ng a permanent presence alongside of and some-tlmes conjoined with liberal politics. S o c~a l democracy has ~t s own Intermittently fashlonable critlcs, largely anarchlst and libertar~an In character. Since ~t sponsors certaln sorts of communal ~dcntificat~on, it IS less subject to c o m m u n~t a r~a n critlc~sm than liberalism IS. But ~t can never escape such cntlclsm entirely, for liberals and s o c~a l democrats alike share a commitment to economlc growth and cope (although In different ways) with the deraclnated s o c~a l forms that growth produces. Commun~ty itself IS largely an ~d e o l o g~c a l presence In modern soc~ety; it has no recurrent critlcs of its own. It IS ~ntermittently fash~onable only because it no longer exlsts In anyth~ng like full strength, and it IS critlclzed only when it IS fash~onable.
The communitar~an critlque IS nonetheless a powerful one; it would not recur if ~t were not capable of engaglng our mlnds and feelings. In t h~s essay, I want to Investigate the power of its current Amerlcan verslons and then offer a verslon of my own-less powerful, perhaps, than the ones with whlch I shall begln, but more available for incorporation w~t h~n liberal (or s o c~a l democrat~c) polit~cs. I do not mean (I hardly have the capacity) to lay communltarlanlsm to rest, although I would willingly Walt for its reappearance In a form more coherent and lnclslve than that In w h~c h ~t currently appears. The problem with communltarlan critlclsm today -I am not the first to notice t h~s -I S that it suggests two different, and deeply contradictory, arguments agalnst liberalism. One of these arguments IS a~m e d pr~marily at liberal practlce, the other pr~marily at liberal theory, but they cannot both be nght. It IS possible that each one IS partly r~g h t -~n d e e d , I shall lnslst on just thls part~al validity-but each of the arguments IS r~g h t In a way that undercuts the value of the other.
The first argument holds that liberal political theory accurately represents liberal s o c~a l practlce. A s if the Marx~st account of ideolog~cal reflect~on were literally true, and exemplified here, contemporary Western socletles (Amerlcan soclety espec~ally) are taken to be the home of radically ~solatcd ~ndiv~duals, rational egotists, and ex~stential agents, men and women protected and div~ded by thelr Inalienable nghts. Liberalism tells the truth about the asoc~al soc~ety that liberals create-not, In fact, ex nihilo as t h e~r theory suggests, but In a struggle agalnst tradit~ons and commun~ties and author~ties that are forgotten as soon as they are escaped, so that liberal practices seem to have no h~story. The struggle itself is r~tually celebrated but rarely reflected on. The members of liberal soclety share no polit~cal or relig~ous tradit~ons; they can tell only one story about themselves and that 1s the story of ex nihilo creation, wh~ch beg~ns In the state of nature or the o r~g~n a l position. Each lndivldual imaglnes h~mself absolutely free, unencumbered, and on h~s own -and enters soclety, accepting its obligat~ons, only In order to mlnlmlze h~s r~sks. His goal IS security, and security IS, as Marx wrote, "the assurance of h~s egolsm." And as he lmaglnes h~mself, so he really I S , [hat IS, an lndivldual separated from the community, withdrawn into hlmself, wholly preoccupied with h~s prlvate Interest and acting In accordance with h~s prlvate caprice.
The only bond between men IS natural necessity, need, and prlvate Interest.' (I have used masculine pronouns In order to fit my sentences to Marx's. But ~t IS an Interesting question, not addressed here, whether t h~s first communltar~an crit~que speaks to the experience of women: Are necessity and pnvate Interest the~r only bonds with one another?)
The wrltlngs of the young Marx represent one of the early appearances of communltarlan cr~tic~sm, and hls argument, first made In the 1840s, IS powerfully present today. Alasta~r MacIntyre's description of the lncoherence of modem ~ntellectual and cultural life and the loss of narrative capacity makes a s~milar polnt In updated, state-of-the-art, theoretical language.* But the only theory that IS necessary to the commun~tar~an critlque of liberalism IS liberalism Itself. All that the crltlcs have to do, so they say, IS to take liberal theory senously. The self-portrait of the lndiv~dual constituted only by h~s willfulness, liberated from all connect~on, w~thout common values, b~nding tles, customs, or tradit~ons-sans eyes, sans teeth, sans taste, sans everything-need only be evoked In order to be devalued: It IS already the concrete absence of value. What can the real life of such a person be like? Imag~ne h~m maxlmlzlng hls utilit~es, and soc~ety IS turned Into a war of all aga~nst all, the familiar rat race, In wh~ch, as Hobbes wrote, there IS "no other goal, nor other garland, but belng foremost."' Imag~ne h~m enjoylng h~s r~ghts, and soc~etyIS reduced to the coex~stence of Isolated selves, for liberal nghts, according to thls first cr~tique, have more todowith "exit" than w~t h "vo~ce."~ They are concretely expressed In separat~on, divorce, w~thdrawal, solitude, prtvacy, and political apathy. And finally, the very fact that lndiv~dual life can be described In these two philosophical languages, the language of utilities and the language of r~ghts, IS a further mark, says MacIntyre, of ~t s Incoherence: Men and women In liberal soc~ety no longer have access to a s~ngle moral culture wlth~n whlch they can learn how they ought to live.s There IS no consensus, no public meeting-of-m~nds, on the nature of the good life, hence the trlumph of prlvate caprlce, revealed, for example, in Sartrean ex~stentialism, the ~deolog~cal reflection of everyday caprlclousness. common standards, to gu~de the Invention -these are myth~cal figures. How can any group of people be strangers to one another when each member of the group IS born w~t h parents, and when these parents have fr~ends, relatlves, ne~ghbors, comrades at work, corelig~on~sts, and fellow c~tizens-connections, In fact, wh~ch are not so much chosen as passed on and ~nhented? Liberalism may well enhance the s~gnificance of purely contractual tles, but 11is obv~ously false to suggest, as Hobbes sometimes seemed to do, that all our connections are mere "market fr~endships," voluntar~st and self-~nterested In character, which cannot outlast the advantages they bnng.' It IS In the very nature of a human society that ~ndiv~duals bred with~n twill find themselves caught up In patterns of relat~onsh~p, networks of power, and comrnun~ties of mean~ng. That quality ofbelng caught up IS what makes them persons of a certaln sort. And only then can they make themselves persons of a (marg~nally) different sort by reflect~ng on what they are and by acting In more or less dist~nct~ve ways with~n the patterns, networks, and communit~es that are willy-nilly the~rs.
The burden of the second crltlque IS that the deep structure even of liberal soclety IS In fact communltarlan. Liberal theory distorts t h~s reality and, Insofar as we adopt the theory, depr~ves us of any ready access to our own expenence of communal embeddedness. The rhetonc of liberalism -this IS the argument of the authors of H a b~t s of the Heart -lim~ts our understanding of our own heart's habits, and glves us no way to formulate the conv~ctions that hold us together as persons and that blnd persons together Into a cornmun~ty.' The assumption here IS that we are In fact persons and that we are In fact bound together. The liberal ~deology of separatism cannot take personhood and bondedness away from us. What ~t does take away IS the sense of our personhood and bondedness, and t h~s depr~vation IS then reflected In liberal polit~cs. It expla~ns our ~nability to form cohes~ve solidar~ties, stable movements and parties, that might make our deep conv~ctions v~sible and effect~ve In the world. It also expla~ns our radical dependence (brilliantly foreshadowed In Hobbes's Levlathan) on the central state.
But how are we to understand t h~s extraordinary disjunction between communal expenence and liberal ~deology, between personal conviction and public rhetonc, and behveen soc~al bondedness and political ~solat~on? That questlon IS not addressed by communitar~an cr~tics of the second sort. If the first c r~t~q u e depends on a vulgar Marx~st theory of reflect~on, the second cnt~que requlres an equally vulgar deali ism. Liberal theory now seems to have a power over and aga~nst real life that has been granted to few theor~es In human h~story. Pla~nly, 11has not been granted to commun~tanan theory, wh~ch cannot, on the first argument, overcome the reality of liberal separat-Ism and cannot, on the second argument, evoke the already exlstlng structures of soclal connection. In any case, the two crit~cal arguments are mutually Inconsistent; they cannot both be true. Liberal separatism either represents or misrepresents the conditions of everyday life. It m~ght, of course, do a little of each -the usual muddle -but that 1s not a satisfactory conclusion from a communltarlan standpoint. For if the account of dissociation and separatism 1s even partly nght, then we have to ralse questions about the depth, so to speak, of the deep structure. And if we are all to some degree communltanans under the skln, then the portralt of social Incoherence loses its crltlcal force.
But each of the two crltical arguments IS partly nght. I will try to say what IS rlght about each, and then ask if something plausible can be made of the parts. First, then, there cannot be much doubt that we (in the United States) live In a soclety where lndivlduals are relat~vely dissociated and separated from one another, or better, where they are continually separating from one another-continually In motlon, often In solitary and apparently random motlon, as if In lmltatlon of what phys~c~sts call BrownIan movement. Hence we live In a profoundly unsettled soclety. We can best see the forms of unsettlement if we track the most Important moves. So, consider (imitating the Chlnese style) the Four Mobilities:
1. Geographicmobility. Amer~cans apparently change the~r res~dence more often than any people In hlstory, at least slnce the barbanan m~grations, excluding only nomadic tribes and families caught up In c~vil or fore~gn wars. Moving people and t h e~r possessrons from one c~t y or town to another 1s a major ~ndustry In the United States, even though many people manage to move themselves. In another sense, of course, we are all self-moved, not refugees but voluntary migrants. The sense of place must be greatly weakened by t h~s extenslve geograph~c mobility, although I find it hard to say whether II I S superseded by mere ~nsensli~vity or by a new sense of many places. Either way, communltarlan feeling seems likely to decline In Importance. Communities are more than just locat~ons, but they are most often successful when they are permanently located. 2. Soc~a/mobi/ity. Thrs article will not address the arguments about how best lo describe soc~al standing or how to measure changes, whether by Income, education, class rnembersh~p, or rank In thc status hierarchy. It 1s enough lo say that fewer Amer~cans stand exactly where thelr parents stood or do what they did than In any soclety forwh~ch we have comparable knowledge. Amer~cans may rnher~t many th~ngs from t h e~r parents, but the extent to w h~c h they make a different life, if only by m a k~n g a different liv~ng, means that fhe ~nher~tance ofcommunity, that IS. the passlngon of beliefsand customary
ways, IS uncertain at best. Whether or not children are thereby robbed of narrative capacity, they seem likely to tell different storles than the~r parents told. 3. Marrralmobiliry. Ratesof separation, divorce, and remarrlage are hlgher today than they have ever been In our own soclety and probably hlgher than they have ever been In any other (except perhaps among Roman aristocrats, although I know of no statistics from that tlme, only anecdotes). The first two mobilit~es, geograph~c and soc~al, also disrupt family life, so that siblings, for example, often live at great distances from one another, and later as uncles and aunts, they are far removed from nephews and nleces. But what we call "broken homes" are the product of marital breaks, of husbands or wlves movlng out-and then, commonly, movlng on to new partners. Insofar as home IS the first community and the first school of ethnlc Identity and relig~ous conviction, t h~s klnd of breakage must have countercommunltarlan consequences. It means that children often do not hear continuous or Identical storles from the adults w~t h whom they live. (Did the greater number of children ever hear such storles? The death of one spouse and the remarrlage of the other may once have been as common as divorce and remarrlage are today. But, then, other sorts of mobility have to be cons~dered: Both men and women are more likely today to marry across class, ethn~c, and religious lines; remarrlage will therefore often produce extraordinarily complex and soc~ally diverse families-w h~c h probably are without h~storlcal precedent.) 4. Polrrlcal mobrlr~y. Loyalty to leaders, movements, parties, clubs, and urban mach~nes seems to decline rap~dly as place and soclal standing and family membership become less central In the shap~ng of personal Identity. Liberal citizens stand outs~de all political organizations and then choose the one that best serves the~r Ideals or Interests. They are, Ideally, ~ndependentvotcrs, that IS, people who move around; they choose for themselves rather than votlng as the~r parents did, and they choose freshly each time rather than repeating themselves. As t h e~r numbers Increase, they make for a volatile electorate and hence for ~nstitutional Instability, particularly at the local level where political organlzatlon once served to re~nforce communal ties.
The effects of the Four Mobilit~es are intensified In a var~ety of ways by other soctal developments whlch we are likely to talk about in the common metaphor of movement: the advance of knowledge, technological progress, and so on. But I am concerned here only with the actual movement of ~ndiv~duals. Liberalism IS, most simply, the theoret~cal endorsement and justificat~on of this m~v e m e n t .~ In the liberal vlew, then, the Four Mobilities represent the enactment of liberty, and the pursuit of (pnvate or personal) happiness. And ~t has to be s a~d that, conceived In this way, liberalism IS a genu~nely popular creed. Any effort to curtail mobility tn the four areas described here would requlre a masslve and harsh applicat~on of state power. Nevertheless, thls popularity has an unders~de of sadness and discontent that are interm~ttently articulated, and commun~tarlanlsm is, most s~mply, the lntermlttent art~culat~on of these feelings. It reflects a sense of loss, and the loss IS real. People do not always leave their old ne~ghborhoods or hometowns willingly or happily. Movlng may be a personal adventure In our standard cultural mytholog~es, but it is as often a family trauma in real life.
The same th~ng IS true of soc~al mobility, wh~ch carries people down as well as up and requlres adjustments that are never easy to manage. Mantal breaks may sometimes glve rlse to new and stronger unlons, but they also pile up what we m~ght think of as family fragments: slngle-parent households, separated and lonely men and women, and abandoned children. And lndependence In politics IS often a not-so-splendid sola at ion: Indiv~duals with oplnlons are cut loose from groups with programs. The result is a decline In "the sense of efficacy," with accompanying effects on commitment and morale.
All In all, we liberals probably know one another less well, and w~t h less assurance, than people once did, although we may see more aspects of the other than they saw, and recognlze In h~m or her a w~der range of possibilities (including the possibility of moving on). We are more often alone than people once were, belng without ne~ghbors we can count on, relatives who live nearby or w~t h whom we are close, or comrades at work or In the movement. T h~s IS the truth of the first communitar~an argument. We must now fix the lim~ts of thls truth by seek~ng what is true In the second argument.
In ~t s easlest verslon, the second argument -that we are really, at bottom, creatures of community -IS certainly true but of uncertain s~gnificance. The tles of place, class or status, family, and even politics survlve the Four Mobilit~es to a remarkable extent. To take just one example, from the last of the Four: It remalns true, even today In t h~s most liberal and mobile of socletles, that the best predictor of how people will vote IS our knowledge of how thelr parents voted." All those dutifully lmitatlve young Republicans and Democrats testify to the failure of liberalism to make Independence or waywardness of mlnd the distlnctlve mark of its adherents. The predictive value of parental behav~or holds even for Independent voters: They are s~mply the heirs of Independence. But we do not know to what extent ~nher~tances sort are a dw~ndling communal resource; i t may be that of t h~s each generation passes on less than ~t received. The full liberalization of the soc~al order, the product~on and reproduct~on of self-~nvent~ng lndiv~duals, may take a long time, much longer, ~ndeed, than liberals themselvesexpected. There IS not much comfort here for communitar~an cr~tics, however; while they can recognlze and value the survlval of older ways of life, they cannot count on, and they must have anxletles about, the v~tality of those ways.
But there IS another approach to the truth of the second critical argument. Whatever the extent of the Four Mobilit~es, they do not seem to move us so far apart that we can no longer talk with one another. We often disagree, of course, but we disagree In mutually comprehensible ways. I should thlnk ~t falrly obv~ous that the philosophical controversies that MacIntyre laments are not In fact a mark of soclal Incoherence. Where there are philosophers, there will be controversies, just as where there are knlghts, there will be tournaments. But these are h~ghly ritualized activities, whlch bear witness to the connection, not the disconnection, of the~r protagonlsts. Evcn polit~cal conflict In liberal socletles rarely takes forms so extreme as to set ~t s protagonlsts beyond negotlatlon and compromise, procedural justlce, and the very possibility of speech. The Amer~can clvil r~ghts struggle IS a nlce example of a conflict for whlch our morallpolit~cal language was and IS entlrely adequate. The fact that the struggle has had only partial success does not reflect lingulst~c Inadequacy but rather polit~cal failures and defeats.
Mart~n Luther King's speeches evoked a palpable tradition, a set of common values such that public disagreement could focus only on how (or how qu~ckly) they mlght best be realized." But t h~s IS not, so to speak, a traditionalist tradition, a Gemernschaft tradit~on, a survival of the preliberal past. It IS a liberal tradition modified, no doubt, by surv~valsof different sorts. The modifications are most obv~ously Protestant and republican In character, though by no means exclus~vely so: The years of mass lmmlgratlon have brought a great varlety of ethnlc and religious memorles to bear on Amer~can politics. What all of them bear on, however, IS liberalism. The language of ~ndivldual rlghts-voluntary assoc~at~on, pluralism, toleration, separation, prlvacy, free speech, the career open to talents, and so on-IS s~mply Inescapable. Who among us seriously attempts to escape? If we really are s~tuated selves, as the second cornmunitarlan cr~tique holds, then our sltuatlon IS largely captured by that vocabulary. Thls IS the truth of the second critique. Does it make any sense then to argue that liberalism prevents us from understanding or malntalnlng the tles that blnd us together?
It makes some sense, because liberalism IS a strange doctrine, whlch seems continually to undercut itself, to disda~n ~t s own traditions, and to produce In each generation renewed hopes for a more absolute freedom from h~story and soclety alike. Much of liberal polit~cal theory, from Locke to Rawls, IS an effort to fix and stabilize the doctrlne In order to end the endlessness of liberal liberation. But beyond every current verslon of liberalism, there IS always a super liberalism, wh~ch, as Roberto Unger says of hls own doctr~ne, "pushes the liberal premlses about state and soclety, about freedom from dependence and governance of soc~al relations by the will, to the po~nt at whlch they merge Into a large ambltion: the building of a soclal world less alien to a self that can always vlolate the generative rules of its own mental or soc~al c~nstructs.'"~ Although Unger was once Identified as a communltarlan, thls ambltion-large Indeed! -seems des~gned to prevent not only any stabilizat~on of liberal doctrlne but also any recovery or creation of communlty. For there is no ~maglnable communlty that would not be alien to the eternally transgresslve self. If the ties that b~n d us together do not bind us, there can be no such t h~n g as a community. If it is anything at all, communltarlan~smIS ant~thetical to transgressLon. And the transgresslve self I S antithetical even to the liberal community whlch I S~t s creator and ~ponsor.'~ Liberalism I S a self-subvert~ng doctr~ne; for that reason, it really does requlre penodic communltarlan correction. But ~t IS not a particularly helpful form of correction to suggest that liberalism IS literally Incoherent or that ~t can be replaced by some preliberal or antiliberal commun~ty wa~ting somehow just beneath the surface or just beyond the honzon. Nothing IS waiting; American communitar~ans have to recognize that there is no one out there but separated, r~ghts-bear~ng, voluntarily assoclatlng, freely speaking, liberal selves. It would be a good thlng, though, if we could teach those selves to know themselves as soc~al beings, the histoncal products of, and In part the embodiments of, liberal values. For the communitar~an correction of liberalIsm cannot be anythlng other than a selective reinforcement of those same values or, to appropriate the well-known phrase of Michael Oakeshott, a pursult of the ~nt~mations of community withln them.
The place to begln the pursuit IS w~t h the liberal Idea of voluntary assoclation, which 1s not well-understood, i t seems to me, either among liberals or among thelr communitar~an cr~tics. In both its theory and ~t s practice, liberalism expresses strong assoc~ative tendencies alongs~de its dissoc~ative tendenc~es: Its protagonists form groups as well as split off from the groups they form; they joln up and reslgn, marry and divorce. Nevertheless, ~t IS a m~stake, and a character~cally liberal mlstake, to thlnk that the existing patterns of assoclation are entirely or even largely voluntary and contractual, that is, the product of will alone. In a liberal soclety, as In every other society, people are born Into very Important sorts of groups, born w~t h ~dent~ties, male or female, for example, work~ng class, Catholic or Jewish, black, democrat, and so on. Many of thelr subsequent assoc~ations (like the~r subsequent careers) merely express these underly~ng ~dentit~es, whlch, agaln, are not so much chosen as enacted.I4 Liberalism I S distlngulshed less by the freedom to form groups on the bas~s of these Identities than the freedom to leave the groups and sometimes even the Identities behlnd. Assoc~ation IS always at r~s k i n a liberal soclety. The boundar~es of the group are not policed; people come and go, or they just fade Into the distance w~thout ever quite acknowledging that they have left. That IS why liberalism IS plagued by free-rider problems-by people who continue to enjoy the benefits of membersh~p and Identity while no longer partlc~patlng In the activities that produce those benefits." Communitar~anlsm, by contrast, is the dream of a perfect free-r~derlessness.
At ~t s best, the liberal soclety 1s the soclal unlon of soclal untons that John Rawls described: a pluralism of groups bonded by shared ldeas of toleration and democracy.'' But if all the groups are precarious, continually on the brink of dissolution or abandonment, then the larger union must also be weak and vulnerable. Or, alternatively, its leaders and officials will be drlven to compensate for the failures of association elsewhere by strengthen~ng thelr own unlon, that IS, the central state, beyond the limits that liberalism has established. These limits are best expressed in terms of individual r~ghts and clvil liberties, but they also include a prescrlptlon for state neutrality. The good life IS pursued by indiv~duals, sponsored by groups; the state presides over the pursuit and the sponsorsh~p but does not partlc~pate In either. Presiding is singular In character; pursulng and sponsorlng are plural. Hence ~t IS a critical questton for liberal theory and pract~ce whether the associative passlons and energies of ordinary people are likely over the long haul to survlve the Four Mobilities and prove themselves suffic~ent to the requirements of pluralism. There IS at least some ev~dence that they will not prove suffic~ent-w~thout a little help. But, to repeat an old question, whence cometh our help? A few of the exlstlng soclal unions live In the expectation of div~ne assistance. For the rest, we can only help one another, and the agency through whlch help of that sort comes most expeditiously 1s the state. But what klnd of a state IS ~t that fosters assoclatlve actlvitles? What k~n d of a soclal unlon IS it that ~ncludes w~thout incorporating a great and discordant var~ety of soclal un~ons?
Obv~ously, it IS a liberal state and soc~al unlon; any other k~n d IS too dangerous for communities and individuals alike. It would be an odd enterprlse to argue i n the name of communltarianlsm for an alternative state, for that would be to argue against our own polit~cal traditions and to repudiate whatever community we already have. But the commun~tarlan correction does requlre a liberal state of a certaln sort, conceptually though not hlstorlcally unusual: a state that IS, at least over some part of the terrain of sovereignty, deliberately nonneutral. The standard liberal argument for neutrality 1s an lnduct~on from soc~al fragmentation. Since dissoc~ated lndivlduals will never agree on the good life, the state must allow them to live as they th~nk best, subject only to John Stuart Mill's harm principle, w~thout endors~ng or sponsorlng any particular understanding of what "best" means.
But there IS a problem here: The more dissociated lndiv~duals are, the stronger the state IS likely to be, since ~t will be the only or the most Important soc~al unlon. And then membership In the state, the only good that 1s shared by all individuals, may well come to seem the good that IS "best."
T h~s IS only to repeat the first communitar~an critique, and it Invites a response like the second crit~que: that the state 1s not In fact the only or even, for ordinary people In the~r everyday lives, the most Important soclal unlon. All sorts of other groups continue to exlst and to give shape and purpose to the lives of thelr members, despite the trlumph of ~n d i v~d u a l rlghts, the Four Mobilities In whlch that tnumph IS manifest, and the free-r~ding that it makes possible. But these groups are continually at risk. And so the state, if ~t IS to remain a liberal state, must endorse and sponsor some of them, namely, those that seem most likely to provrde shapes and purposes congen~al to the shared values of a liberal society." No doubt, there are problems here too, and I do not mean to deny t h e~r difficulty. But I see no way to avoid some such formulat~on -and not only for theoretical reasons. The actual hlstory of the best liberal states, as of the best soclal democratic states (and these tend ~ncreas~ngly to be the same states), suggest that they behave In exactly t h~s way, although often very Inadequately.
Let me glve three relatively familiar examples of state behav~or of thls klnd. First, the Wagner Act of the 1930s: Thls was not a standard liberal law, h~nderlng the hindrances to unlon organlzatlon, for it actlvely fostered union organlzatlon, and ~t did so prec~sely by solvlng the free-r~der problem. By requlrlng collective barga~nlng whenever there was majorlty support (but not necessarily unan~mous support) for the unlon, and then by allowlng unlon shops, the Wagner Act sponsored the creation of strong unlons capable, at least to some degree, of determ~nlng the shape of industnal relation^.'^ Of course, there could not be strong unlons wlthout work~ng class solidarity; unlonlzatlon IS parasitic on underlylng communlties of feeling and belief. But those underlylng communlties were already belng eroded by the Four Mobilit~es when the Wagner Act was passed, and so the Act sewed to counter the dissociative tendcnc~cs of liberal society. It was nevertheless a liberal law, for the unions that zt helped create enhanced the lives of ~ndivldual workers and were subject to dissolut~on and abandonment zn accordance w~t h liberal principles should they ever cease to do that.
The second example IS the use of tax exemptions and matchlng grants of tax money to enable different relig~ous groups to run extenslve systems of day-care centers, nurslng homes, hospitals, and so on-welfare societies lns~de the welfare state. I do not pretend that these prlvate and pluralist socletles compensate for the shoddiness of the Amerlcan welfare state. But they do Improve the delivery of servlces by m a k~n g it a more Immediate funct~on of communal solidarity. The state's role here, b e s~d e establishing m~n~m a l standards, IS to abate, slnce In thls case ~t cannot ent~rely solve the free-rider problem. If some number of men and women end up In a Catholic nurslng home, even though they never contributed to a Catholic charity, they will at least have p a~d thelr taxes. But why not nationalize the entlre welfare system and end free-r~dershlp? The liberal response IS that the social unlon of soc~al unlons must always operate at two levels: A welfare system run entlrely by prlvate, nonprofit assoc~ations would be dangerously Inadequate and lnequ~table In its coverage; and a totally nationalized system would deny expression to local and partlcularlst solidar~ties.'~ The thlrd example IS the passage of plant-closlng laws deslgned to afford some protectlon to local communit~es of work and res~dence. lnhabltants are Insulated, although only for a tlme, agalnst market pressure to move out of t h c~r old ne~ghborhoods and search for work elsewhere. Although the market "needs" a hlghly mobile work force, the state takes other needs Into account, not only In a welfarlst way (through unemployment Insurance and job retralnlng programs) but also In a communitar~an way. But the state IS not srmilarly committed to the preservation of every ne~ghborhood community. It I S entirely neutral toward commun~ties of ethnlclty and res~dence, offerlng no protectlon aga~nst strangers who want to move In. Here, geograph~c mobility remalns a positlve value, one of the rlghts of cit~zens.
Un~ons, relig~ous organizations, and nelghborhoods each draw on feelings and belicfs that, In p r~n c~p l e if not always in hlstory, predate the emergence of the liberal state. How strong these feelings and beliefs are, and what thelr survlval value IS, I cannot say. Have the unlons established such a grlp on the ~maglnatlons of t h e~r members as to make for good stones? There are some good stones, first told, then retold, and sometimes even re-enacted. But the narrative line does not seem suffic~ently compelling to younger workers to sustaln anythlng like the old worklng class solidarity. Nor IS ~t suffic~ent for a relig~ous organlzatlon to provlde life cycle servlces for ~t s members if they are no longer Interested In ~t s relig~ous servlces. Nor are ne~ghborhoods proof for long agalnst market pressure. Still, communal feeling and belief seem considerably more stable than we once thought they would be, and the proliferat~on of secondary assoc~atlons In liberal soc~ety IS remarkableeven if many of them have short lives and translent memberships. One has a sense of people worklng together and t r y~n g to cope, and not, as the first communltarlan c r~t~q u e suggests, just gett~ng by on t h e~r own, by themselves, one by one.
A good liberal (or soc~al democratic) state enhances the possibilities for cooperative coplng. John Dewey prov~ded a useful account of such a state In The Public and Its Problems. Published in 1927, the book 1s a commentary on and a part~al endorsement of an earlier round of communitarian critlclsm. Dewey shared w~t h the critlcs of h~s t~m e , who called themselves "pluralists," an uneasiness w~t h the sovereign state, but he was not quite as uneasy as most of them were. He also shared an adm~rat~on for what he called "pr~mary grouplngs" w~t h~n the state, but he was more Inclined than the pluralistswere to qualify h~s admuation. Pr~mary grouplngs, he wrote, are "good, bad, and Indifferent," and they cannot by the~r mere existence fix the limits of state activity. The state 1s not "only an umplre to avert and remedy trespasses of one group upon another." It has a larger function: "It renders the deslrable assoclatlon solider and more coherent.
It places a discount upon lnjur~ous grouplngs and renders the~r tenure of life precarious [and] ~t glves the ~ndiv~dual members of valued assoclatlons greater liberty and security; ~t relieves them of hampering condit~ons. It enables lndiv~dual members to count wrth reasonable certainty upon what others will d~."'~These may seem like tasks too extensrve for a liberal state, but they are constrained by the constitutional establishment of ~ndiv~dual r~ghts-wh~ch are themselves (on the pragmatic understanding) not so much recognit~ons of what ~ndividuals by nature are or have as expressions of hope about what they will be and do. Unless lndiv~duals act together in certain ways, state actlon of the sort that Dewey recommended cannot get started. When we recognlze the "r~ght of the cltlzens peacefully to assemble," for example, we are hoplng for assemblies of c~tizens. If we then discrlmlnate among such assemblies, we do so on lim~ted grounds, foster~ng only those that really do express communities of feeling and belief and do not v~olate liberal prlnc~ples of assoclatlon.
It I S often argued these days that the nonneutral state, whose activit~es I have made somc attcmpt to justify, 1s best understood In republican terms. A rev~val of neoclassical republicanism prov~des much of the substance of contemporary communitar~an politics. The revlval, I have to say, 1s largely academic; unlike other versions of commun~tar~an~sm In Dewey's time and ours, ~t has no external reference. There really are unions, churches, and ne~ghborhoods In Amer~can soclety, but there are virtually no examples of republican assoc~ation and no movement or party a~med at promoting such association. Dewey would probably not recognlze h~s "public," nor Rawls h~s "soc~al un~on," as verslons of republicanism, if only because In both these cases, energy and commitment have been dralned from the singular and narrowly polit~cal assoclatlon to the more varlous associat~ons of civil soclety. Republican~sm by contrast 1s an Integrated and unitary doctrlne In whlch energy and commitment are focused primarily on the political realm. It is a doctr~ne adapted (in both ~t s class~cal and neoclass~cal forms) to the needs of small, homogeneous communit~es, where clvil soclety 1s radically undifferentiated. Perhaps the doctrlne can be extended to account for a "republic of republics," a decentralized and partic~patory revlslon of liberal democracy. A cons~derable strengthen~ng of local governments would then be requlred In the hope of encouraging the development and display of c i v~c vlrtue In a pluralist vanety of social settings. T h~s Indeed IS a pursuit of the lntlmatlons of community within liberalism, for ~t has more to do with John Stuart Mill than with Rousseau. Now we are to lmaglne the nonneutral state empowering c~ties, towns, and boroughs; foster~ng ne~ghborhood committees and revlew boards; and always on the look-out for bands of c~tizens ready to take responsibility for local affairs2'
None of this IS any guarantee agalnst the eroslon of the underly~ng communities or the death of local loyalt~es. It is a matter of principle that commun~ties must always be at r~sk. And the great paradox of a liberal soclety IS that one cannot set oneself agalnst t h~s pnnc~ple without also setting oneself agalnst the tradit~onal practices and shared understandings of the society. Here, respect for tradition requires the precariousness of traditionalism. If the first communitarian crltique were true in ~t s entirety, if there were no commun~ties and no traditions, then we could just proceed to invent new ones. Insofar as the second critlque IS even partly true, and the work of communal lnventlon I S well begun and continually In progress, we must rest content with the k~nds of corrections and enhancements-they would be, In fact, more radical than these terms suggest-that Dewey described.
I have avolded until now what is often taken to be the central Issue between liberals and the~r communltanan crit~cs-the const~tutlon of the self.22 Liberalism, it 1s commonly s a~d , 1s founded on the Idea of a presoc~al self, a solitary and sometimes hero~c ~ndiv~dual confronting society, who IS fully formed before the confrontat~on begins. Communitar~an critlcs then argue, first, that instability and dissociation are the actual and disheartening ach~evement of individuals of thls sort and, second, that there really cannot be indiv~duals of thls sort. The critlcs are commonly s a~d In turn to believe In a radically soc~alized self that can never "confront" soc~ety because it IS, from the beglnn~ng, entangled In soc~ety, Itself the embodiment of social values. The disagreement seems sharp enough, but In fact, In practice, it IS not sharp at all-for ne~ther of these vlews can be susta~ned for long by anyone who goes beyond staklng out a pos~tion and trles to elaborate an argument.*-' Nor does liberal or communltarlan theory requlre vlews of this sort. Contemporary liberals are not committed to a presoc~al self, but only to a self capable of reflecting critically on the values that have governed its soc~alizatlon; and communltarlan crlt~cs, who are d o~n g exactly that, can hardly go on to cla~m that soc~alizat~on IS everything. The philosophical and psycholog~cal Issues here go very deep, but so far as polit~cs IS concerned, there I S little to be won on t h~s battlefield; concessions from the other s~d e come too easily to count as vlctorles.
The central Issue for political theory IS not the constitution of the self but the connection of const~tuted selves, the pattern of soc~al relations. LiberalIsm 1s best understood as a theory of relat~onsh~p, whlch has voluntary association at its center and wh~ch understands voluntariness as the r~ght of rupture or w~thdrawal. What makes a marrlage voluntary IS the permanent possibility of divorce. What makes any Identity or affiliation voluntary is the easy availability of alternative Identities and affiliations. But the easier t h~s easlness IS, the less stable all our relat~onsh~ps are likely to become. The Four Mobilit~es take hold and soclety seems to be In perpetual motion, so that the actual subject of liberal practice, ~t might be s a~d , IS not a presoc~al but a postsoc~al self, free at last from all but the most temporary and limited alliances. Now, the liberal self reflects the fragmentation of liberal soclety: It I S radically underdeterm~ned and div~ded, forced to Invent ~tself anew for every public occasion. Some liberals celebrate this freedom and self-inventlon; all cornmunitarlans lament its arrlval, even while ~ns~sting that it IS not a possible human condit~on.
I have argued that Insofar as liberalism tends toward instability and dissoc~at~on, t requlres per~odic communltarlan correction. Rawls's "soc~al unlon of soc~al un~ons" reflects and builds on an earlier correction of t h~s k~n d , the work of Amencan writers like Dewey, Randolph Bourne, and Horace Kallen. Rawls has glven us a generalized version of Kallen's argument that Amer~ca, after the great ~mm~gration, was and should remaln a "nation of nati~nalities."~~ In fact, however, the eroslon of nat~onality seems to be a feature of liberal soc~al life, despite lntermlttent ethnlc revlvals like that of the late 1960s and 1970s. We can generalize from t h~s to the more or less steady attenuation of all the underlying bonds that make soc~al unlons possible. There IS no strong or permanent remedy for communal attenuation short of an antiliberal curtailment of the Four Mobilities and the rlghts of rupture and divorce on whlch they rest. Communltanans sometimes dream of such a curtailment, but they rarely advocate ~t .
The only community that most of them actually know, after all, 1s just thls liberal unlon of unions, always precarious and always at rlsk. They cannot trlumph over thls liberalIsm; they can only, sometimes, reinforce its Internal associative capacities. The reinforcement 1s only temporary, because the capacity for dissoclatlon 1s also strongly Internalized and hlghly valued. That 1s why cornmunitanantsm crltlclsm 1s doomed-it probably 1s not a terrible fate-to eternal recurrence.
NOTES
